## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

lational Intelligence Offi	cers	28 February 1979	
MEMORANDUM FO	R: Director of Central In	telligence	
FROM	: Richard Lehman National Intelligence	Officer for Warning	
SUBJECT	: DCID 1/5		
1. <u>Acti</u> Paragraph 8.	on Requested: That you ta	ke the action recommended in	
he apparently	ground: At a meeting with asked that he be consulted Strategic Warning).	Secretary Brown in January, d before any change is made	
organization put as the firmulated a commulated a community to encompass and to create (Attachment B	for warning, I convened the rst item on its agenda revise. The Group met several draft that forms Attachmen sentially adapts the previous the broader definition of the NIO for Warning and the the 1976 version.) In new definition.	t A to this memorandum. ous 1/5 issued in May 1976 warning that you directed	
visions of the formally bless forward for NI for crisis man Warning Staff	e new draft, I think effectsed. The Working Group has IB coordination until a) nagement was resolved, and was completed. These two	since October under the pro- tively, though it has not been s deferred moving the draft the question of its responsibilit b) its review of the Strategic questions have now been settled,	

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Working Group.

## Approved For R ase 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83B01027R 200140001-0

- 5. While these matters have taken some time, I have welcomed the delay because I had hoped that some resolution of the one outstanding question would emerge that would not involve a major bureaucratic struggle. The Working Group is fully agreed on the wording of the new draft with the exception of Paragraph 3b. There was originally strong feeling in the Department of Defense that the Director's senior warning officer should report directly to him (or the DDCI) and should not be "buried in NFAC." After much discussion, we arrived at the language in Paragraph 3b, to which DIA reluctantly agreed. At that time, the OSD rep insisted on the footnote that now appears. I have since been informed that OSD no longer feels so strongly, largely because of the way that I have approached the job, and probably will no longer take exception to this language.
- 6. To bring DoD along, I have spent a good deal of time in talking to senior officers both in Washington and in the field and explaining to them my concept of the job. In so doing, I have assured them that, despite my subordination to NFAC, I indeed have access to you and to Frank Carlucci when I need it and that I am not handicapped by being an NIO, rather than a special assistant to you.

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- 7. There is also a problem on the other side. Bob Bowie feels that the draft is not strong enough in precisely this way. (He is, however, quite happy with the way I am actually handling the job.) His proposed change is shown in Attachment A, Paragraph 3b. Unfortunately, informal soundings I have taken in the Pentagon have convinced me that any change in this language that makes more explicit my subordination to NFAC will cause this fragile agreement to come apart, and my credibility as your officer on these problems will be badly damaged.
- 8. I clearly cannot go to the Working Group with a revised draft until I am confident that we will stand behind Paragraph 3b as originally agreed. Frank tells me that you are willing to talk to Bob and I would like to ask you to do this soon. Once the draft has been sent out for formal NFIB coordination, you might mention it to Secretary Brown in case he wishes to involve himself more than by his representation on the Working Group and on NFIB.

Richard Lehman

Attachment A Attachment B

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